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In his timely article, Cherniss offers his vision for the future of “Emotional Intelligence” 
(EI). However, his goal of clarifying the concept by distinguishing definitions from models and 
his support for “Emotional and Social Competence” (ESC) models will, in our opinion, not make 
the field advance. To be upfront, we agree that emotions are important for effective decision-
making, leadership, performance and the like; however, at this time, EI and ESC have not yet 
demonstrated incremental validity over and above IQ and personality tests in meta-analyses 
(Harms & Credé, 2009; Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004).  
If there is a future for EI, we see it in the ability model of Mayer, Salovey and associates 
(e.g, Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2000), which detractors and supporters agree holds the most 
promise (Antonakis, Ashkanasy, & Dasborough, 2009; Zeidner, Roberts, & Matthews, 2008). 
With their use of quasi-objective scoring measures, the ability model grounds EI in existing 
frameworks of intelligence, thus differentiating itself from ESC models and their self-rated trait 
inventories. In fact, we do not see the value of ESC models: They overlap too much with current 
personality models to offer anything new for science and practice (Zeidner, et al., 2008). 
In this commentary we raise three concerns we have with Cherniss’s suggestions for ESC 
models: (1) there are important conceptual problems in both the definition of ESC and the 
distinction of ESC from EI; (2) Cherniss’s interpretation of neuroscience findings as supporting 
the constructs of EI and ESC is outdated, and (3) his interpretation of the famous marshmallow 
experiment as indicating the existence of ESCs is flawed. Building on the promise of ability 
models, we conclude by providing suggestions to improve research in EI. 
1. Definitional Problems 
Cherniss attempts to distinguish ESCs from EI. For EI, he adopts the ability model’s 
definition as an individual-difference ability applied to perception and expression of emotion, use 
of emotion in thought and reasoning, and self- and other-emotional regulation. For ESCs, he uses 
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a definition by Boyatzis stating that ESC’s are EI-related qualities “of the person that lead(s) to or 
causes effective or superior performance.” This latter definition is problematic on three grounds. 
First, the definition of ESC is defined by its outcome (i.e., performance) and its cause 
(i.e., EI). Thus, ESC does not exist in the absence of EI or performance. As MacKenzie (2003, p. 
325) noted, defining a concept by its causes and its outcomes “is not helpful because this 
definition does not specify the ‘nature’ of . . . the construct. Defining a construct in this manner 
also makes it impossible to empirically test the proposed theoretical linkages between the 
construct and the specific antecedents and consequences mentioned, because these relationships 
are assumed to be true by definition.” Cherniss’s approach seems to confuse defining a construct 
with embedding it into a nomological network. The latter is an important aspect of construct 
validation but does not substitute for a definition that establishes the unique properties of a 
construct independent of its relationships to other variables. 
Second, his conceptual distinction between EI and ESC is unclear: He suggests that EI is 
an ability and ESC is a competency. Cherniss, however, also refers to competencies as abilities. 
This confusion about abilities and competencies is not surprising. Boyatzis (2008), whose 
definition of competency Cherniss also cites, defined an “emotional intelligence competency” as 
“an ability to recognize, understand, and use emotional information about oneself … that leads to 
or causes effective or superior performance” (p. 228). So what is ESC: An ability or a 
competency? If it is the former, ESC or EI is redundant. If it is the latter, ESC remains undefined. 
Third, in delineating models and definitions of EI, Cherniss stated that EI provides “a 
useful catalogue of the personal qualities, other than cognitive intelligence, that most strongly aid 
adaptation” [italics ours].  Thus, EI models are defined by exclusion--a “laundry list of virtually 
every positive quality of character except for cognitive intelligence” (Zeidner, et al., 2008, pp. 64-
65). Such reasoning does not help the field advance because it does not prospectively define the 
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EI construct; that is, this definition does not specify what exactly is included in the construct. It 
opens the door to pass off established constructs such as personality traits as EI. Conceptual 
confusion and imprecision undermines construct validation. As Matthews, Zeidner, and Roberts 
(2002, p. 45) mentioned, “a test should not be labelled a measure of EI when really it is a 
measure of some, other well-established personality-trait or related individual-difference variable. 
. . . If this practice were repeated throughout the scientific community, thousands of new (but 
redundant) tests would flood the market each year.” This redundancy is currently evidenced in 
the fact that EI tests, whether ability- or ESC-based, do not reliably predict incremental variance 
in performance outcomes (Harms & Credé, 2009; Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004).  
2. Neuroscience Findings Support IQ and not EI 
Cherniss uses dated findings by Damasio (1994) to highlight cases similar to that of the 
famous Elliot case--briefly, Elliot (and related cases) had damage to the prefrontal cortex yet 
apparently showed normal intelligence; however, he could not make decisions because part of his 
emotional decision-making circuitry (in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, or VM) was 
damaged. Damasio used this case and others to suggest that individuals with brain-damage might 
exhibit normal intelligence but that, because of damage to emotional circuitry, these individuals 
could not make decisions. Cherniss, as have many EI advocates, employs these clinical cases as 
evidence for EI, suggesting that the emotional component of decision-making is EI.  
Part of the argument here, with which we agree, is that the brain uses emotional memories 
associated with the decision-making task at hand (“emotional somatic markers”), which are 
automatically called up and help to guide decision-making (see Letter 3 in Antonakis, et al., 
2009). That is, with experience, individuals associate good and bad “feelings” with certain good 
and bad outcomes. These feelings (i.e., emotional somatic markers) or intuitions are then used 
prospectively to aid decision-making by providing individuals with hunches as to whether a 
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choice is good or bad (these hunches can be reliably measured via galvanic skin responses). This 
paradigm has been tested in the context of a decision-making task that involves what is known as 
the Iowa or Bechara Gambling task (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). This task involves choosing 
cards from four decks, two of which are bad (i.e., they have high immediate rewards but higher 
future losses) and two of which are good (i.e., they have lower immediate rewards but future 
losses are less severe than those of the bad decks). Contrary to normal participants (without brain 
damage), brain-damaged participants do not show any pre-decision physiological (i.e., emotional) 
responses prior to choosing from a bad deck and consistently go for the bad decks.  
The somatic marker hypothesis has received much empirical support (Bechara & 
Damasio, 2005). Yet, as of today there is no research linking performance on an EI test with 
performance on the gambling task. More importantly, research has moved on since Damasio’s 
(1994) initial interpretation of the Elliot case. Current evidence suggests that: (1) working 
memory, which resides in the aforementioned brain region too and which correlates very strongly 
with fluid intelligence, r = .85 (Oberauer, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Süss, 2005), is also needed in 
effective decision making and works in conjunction with other neural circuitry requiring somatic 
markers; (2) damage to the ventromedial region actually damages fluid intelligence too and this 
result has been known since 1996; (3) IQ predicts performance on the gambling task; and (4) the 
“Elliot” brain area (i.e., the VM) is reliably associated with IQ as modern scanning techniques 
show (see Letter 3 in Antonakis, et al., 2009).  
Even Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Anderson (1998) noted, in reinterpreting the 
functions of the VM, that “Our initial prediction that we would find a complete double 
dissociation between decision making and working memory relative to . . . prefrontal cortex, 
however, has to be revised. . . . “decision making seems to be influenced by the intactness or 
impairment of working memory; i.e., the subject’s decision making is affected by having an 
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abnormal working memory” (p. 434). Bechara and Martin (2004) added “that working memory 
and decision making are asymmetrically dependent. Working memory is not dependent on the 
intactness of decision making. . . . On the other hand, the integrity of decision making seems to 
be dependent on the intactness of working memory—that is, the participant’s decision making is 
affected by having an abnormal working memory” (p. 160).  
In summary, a modern interpretation of the Elliot case leads us to view it as supportive of 
the combined roles of IQ, working memory, and somatic markers for decision making (using the 
limbic system and other brain regions associated with IQ). Somatic markers and EI are not 
isomorphic, nor is there evidence linking somatic marker functioning to EI. If anything, 15 years 
of research subsequent to the Elliot case show that the implicit emotional signaling system is 
undergirded by working memory (and IQ) and not vice-versa; hence, Bechara and Martin’s 
(2004) reference to asymmetrical dependence.  
3. The Marshmallows Studies Don’t Support EI either 
As further support for ESC, Cherniss cites the “marshmallows” studies by Shoda, 
Mischel, and Peake (1990) who “found that the children who were able to resist temptation had a 
total SAT score that was 210 points higher on average than those children who were unable to 
wait.” Conceptual and empirical problems, however, mar Cherniss’s use of this study. 
Conceptually, why is delay of gratification is an ESC? Cherniss’s commentary does not 
address this question. Delay of gratification can be defined as the ability to wait for something 
that one desires. Thus, it is plausible to suggest that delay of gratification has both cognitive 
(calculation of future payoffs, risk preference) and emotional aspects. Delay of gratification 
might also reflect the ability to predict socially-desirable behavior expected by parents and 
teachers; it might also reflect aspects of personality (patience, impulsiveness). 
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 Empirically, past and current research provides support for the cognitive aspects of delay 
of gratification. First, a recent meta-analysis by Shamosh and Gray (2008) reported a ρ = .23 
between IQ and delay of gratification; this correlation would have been higher had it been 
corrected for range restriction and unreliability. Further, a neuroscience study by Shamosh et al. 
(2008) found an r = .40 between IQ and delay of gratification and this association was related to 
activity in known IQ brain regions. Third, in a random sample of about 1,000 adults and using an 
incentive-based design with real monetary stakes, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (in press) 
found that IQ predicted delay of gratification after controlling for various personality traits, 
participant income, and other demographic and economic preference factors. In a similar study, 
Burks, Carpenter, Goette, and Rustichini (2009) showed that IQ predicted both short-term and 
long-term delay of gratification in a sample of about 1,000 trainee truckers, again including a 
rigorous set of control variables. Finally, with regard to the emotional aspect of delay of 
gratification, research indicates that personality correlates with it (Ostaszewski, 1996).  
 In addition to the above listed conceptual and empirical problems of labelling delay of 
gratification as an ESC, digging a bit deeper into the Shoda et al. (1990) marshmallow study 
reveals several problems. Delay of gratification correlated significantly with only four out of 
eleven measures of a coping and cognitive competence scale (California Child Q-Set) when the 
effect of SAT was partialled-out (which was used to show that coping is independent of 
intelligence). Four out of eleven is not cause for conclusive inference, particularly when the 
sample size reported by Shoda et al. (1990) was only 33. With such a small sample and multiple 
tests, the significance of the correlations could be due to chance. When controlling for family-
wise error (e.g., Bonferroni correction), and setting the overall Type I error to be .05 in a sample 
of 33, the correlation coefficient must be .49 or greater to achieve significance. How many of the 
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correlations listed by Shoda et al. (1990, see p. 982) were this high? Not one--and this without 
controlling for personality traits. 
We have similar concerns with Cherniss’s interpretation of the study by Duckworth and 
Seligman (2005) as showing that “self discipline predicted grades twice as well as IQ scores in a 
sample of 8th graders.” Again, there is no conceptual justification: Why does Cherniss label self-
discipline as an ESC? Furthermore, a closer look at the study by Duckworth and Seligman 
reveals that the interpretation by Cherniss is not justified, as explained in next paragraph. 
The measure of self-discipline was an index of (a) self and other ratings (e.g., parents and 
teachers) and (b) a behavioral (objective) measure (a marshmallow-style test). Parents and 
teachers obviously knew the grades of the children and would thus probably rate children with 
higher grades as more disciplined (e.g., to maintain cognitive consistency). In addition, we were 
able to obtain the summary data from Duckworth and Seligman. Our reanalysis of these data 
showed that the average correlation between the objective measure of self-discipline and the five 
self/other ratings of self-discipline was only .14, raising concerns about the validity of the index 
of self-discipline. Using only the behavioral measure of self-discipline and the Otis-Lennon IQ 
test scores (constraining its validity to .62, see Guilmette, Kennedy, & Queally, 2001) we found 
that self discipline predicted grades (β = .29, p < .001) but so did IQ (β = .36, p < .001). 
Furthermore, Duckworth and Seligman reported that the observed correlation between IQ and 
grades suffered from range restriction (i.e., instead of r = .32 the correlation should be r = .49), 
suggesting that the effect of IQ is an underestimation. 
The above-listed conceptual and empirical concerns should be taken into account in future 
EI research. At the conceptual level, it will be helpful to explicitly justify why delay of 
gratification and self-discipline are ESCs. Next, as part of the construct validation process, 
measures of EI must predict delay of gratification and self-discipline beyond established 
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predictors (i.e., IQ and personality). Finally, even if delay of gratification and self-discipline were 
indeed ESCs, to establish their relevance for predicting performance it would be good practice to 
control for IQ and personality, which are also predictors of performance in work settings. 
Notably, in the Shoda et al. (1990) and Duckworth and Seligman (2005) studies, the estimates for 
the predictive power of delay of gratification and self-discipline for performance would have 
been even weaker had these studies included personality traits as control variables.  
4. Conclusion: The Future of Emotional Intelligence 
We think that the arguments and evidence that Cherniss presents are not strong. Many of 
the key papers he cites cannot be clearly interpreted to support his reasoning. In conjunction with 
no evidence from meta-analyses for incremental validity of EI/ESC above and beyond IQ and 
personality traits, the future for EI does not bode well, or does it?  
As we mentioned before, the only way we see EI moving forward is to commit firmly to 
the ability definition and its consequences--then there is no need and possibly no room for ESCs. 
Other consequences further include the design of better ability tests and not broader trait-like 
ESC tests. One interesting avenue to for ability tests it to is examine EI scores in terms of a 
congruence model; at this time, answers are scored according to their difference from what the 
majority of respondents (“consensus” scoring) or experts answered. To ensure that findings based 
on these scores are not ambiguous, EI researchers should consider the widely-used statistical 
guidelines provided by Edwards (1995). Perhaps the use of difference scores has been one reason 
for poor results and confounded interpretations.  
Another interesting avenue would be to design tests that have objectively-correct answers, 
by, for example, having the participants’ emotions--who are portrayed in EI test materials--
measured via physiological or other biological means. Interestingly, work currently being done at 
the interface of psychophysics and cognitive psychology can enable computer algorithms to 
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accurately rate human facial expressions (Sorci et al., in press); future work in this area could be 
extended to dynamic testing situations.  
Yet another alternative is to start from basic research in neurosciences to first determine 
whether physiological markers or certain brain regions not linked to IQ can predict performance 
on validated social-psychological tests like nonverbal decoding ability or interpersonal sensitivity 
(Hall, 1978; see Hall, Andrzejewski, & Yopchick, 2009). It is unfortunate that much of the 
research done in EI has wholly ignored the rich history of research in related areas of social 
psychology. Building on research programs in these areas might prove to be fruitful. In summary, 
there is much that could be done to take EI to the next level. The foundations of this 
transformation must be built on the firm theoretical and empirical grounding of ability tests.  
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